CMN

• Beneish M-Score -1.2938 (83rd percentile vs VN peers): measures the likelihood of earnings manipulation patterns; the company sits toward the more aggressive side of Vietnamese peers and the M-Score worsened by -0.32 year-over-year.
• Days Sales Receivables Index (DSRI) = 1.4274: measures growth in receivables relative to sales; a value >1 suggests receivables grew faster than sales, consistent with collection pressure or revenue recognition changes.
• AQI = 1.2351 (asset quality index): measures reclassification of assets to potentially less reliable categories; >1 indicates rising non-standard or longer-term receivables/prepayments/other assets.
• DEPI = 1.1891 (depreciation index): >1 implies slower depreciation relative to prior period, which can inflate operating income.
• TATA = 0.1194 (total accruals to total assets): positive accruals indicate earnings are supported by accruals rather than cash; the Earnings Quality Score shows low cash-based quality (cash conversion 0.0/100) and low receivables quality (0.0/100).
• Cash conversion ratio (3-year OCF / net profit) = 0.08 (23rd percentile among Vietnamese non-financial firms): only 0.08 of reported profit converted to operating cash flow over three years, a sign profits are not producing cash.
• Earnings Quality Score 24.7/100 with accruals quality 54.8/100 and margin quality 48.8/100: overall low earnings quality driven by cash and receivables components.
• Director-deal registrations (2025-10-30 to 2026-10-30): 4 sale registrations (960,000 shares total; 3 without volume specified) and 3 purchase registrations (3 without volume specified) — these are registered intentions with the exchange, not executed trades.

• Altman Z-Score = 8.25 (safe zone): measures bankruptcy risk using multiple balance-sheet ratios; a high Z-Score implies low measured insolvency risk.
• Piotroski F-Score = 5/9 (neutral): a middling score indicating mixed signals on profitability, leverage/liquidity, and operating efficiency.
• SGAI = 0.9241 (<1): selling, general & administrative expenses scaled to sales declined year-over-year, which can support margin sustainability.
• LVGI = 0.9622 (<1) and SGI = 1.0778 (moderate growth): limited volatility in leverage and only modest sales growth, reducing some pressure that aggressive accounting might otherwise follow.
• Receivables outside the trade cycle 2.3% of total assets (51st percentile): the proportion of prepayments, loans receivable and other long-term receivables is around median among Vietnamese peers, not unusually large.

Ownership is concentrated: three shareholders together hold 70.8% (Tổng Công ty Lương thực Miền Nam 30.7%, Mesa 20.1%, Hồ Đắc Khuê Anh 20.0%), with additional insiders (Trịnh Việt Dũng 9.7%). Such concentration implies significant control by a few institutional and individual holders. Director-deal registrations show some insiders registered both sales and purchases during the 12-month window (registrations are intentions filed with the exchange).

• Compare the year‑end balance for ‘Receivables and prepayments’ (note/schedule) with the AQI components to see which asset categories (prepayments to suppliers, loans receivable, other long‑term receivables) drove AQI = 1.2351 and the reported 2.3% of assets outside the trade cycle.
• Reconcile operating cash flow and net profit over the last three years in the cash flow statement and the accounting policy note to verify the 3‑year cash conversion ratio = 0.08 and identify major non‑cash accruals (TATA = 0.1194).
• Inspect the depreciation policy and fixed‑asset schedule (useful lives and accumulated depreciation) to assess why DEPI = 1.1891 (slower depreciation) and whether changes in useful lives or capitalization policies occurred.
• Review the Director/Related‑party transaction disclosures and the exchange registration announcements to confirm the 4 sale and 3 purchase registrations (dates, registrants, and any stated volumes) and any related‑party loan or service schedules that could link to AQI or DSRI movements.