Calibrated intrinsic value vs last close
Illustrative estimate- Last close (VND)
- 13.300
- Calibrated intrinsic value (VND)
- 15.513
Last close × (1 + calibrated gap / 100)
Earnings-capitalised value
Not available: the company reported a loss last year or its shares have too short a price history.
How it is calculated
- 1Measure the gap
Between the model and the last close.
- 2Check the record2015–2024
What gaps of that size went on to earn over the following year.
- 3Apply to the close
That return is applied to the last close.
Keep in mind
- For illustration only: not a validated forecast.
- No uncertainty range: the estimate is a single figure.
- Older record: it has not been re-measured on the current data.
Why it needs review
- Under financial distress the model falls back to book value.
This estimate remains visible for checking its calculation. Its inputs require review before using it in a stock comparison. The model comparison behind this value needs review. The estimate does not remove the data limitations listed above.
Comparison assessed 3 Nov 2026Valid through 2 Dec 2026
- Model reliability
- Low
- Model fitInput stabilityRisk checks
- High requires the model’s diagnostic criteria to be met.
- Probability of outperforming peers
- Not assessed
- A separate peer-outperformance probability is unavailable for this valuation.
These assessments address different questions. Neither establishes that the displayed valuation is correct or guarantees a future return.
Valuation Breakdown
Developers often carry land banks at historical cost under VAS, so book value can understate asset value. This model blends two approaches: an RNAV proxy (book value with its property share marked up 1.5×) weighted 40%, and a DCF on normalized cash flows weighted 60%. Highly leveraged firms receive a +2% WACC penalty.
Technical details
RE developers carry large land inventories at historical cost; cash flows depend on project delivery timing. RNAV captures hidden land value, while DCF captures earnings power. The leverage screen guards against over-leveraged developers.
RNAV proxy: the property share of BVPS (investment property, fixed assets and inventories over total assets) × 1.5 plus the rest at book, or 1.25× all of book when that share is 10% or less or unknown, cut by up to 50% as D/E rises above 2. DCF: 5-year projection on median cash flow with CAPM-derived WACC. If D/E > 3 or interest coverage < 1.5, WACC is increased by 2%. Final value = 40% RNAV + 60% DCF.
Property developers and real estate firms with significant land banks recorded at below-market historical cost.
We take the model’s gap to the last close, read what gaps of that size went on to earn over the following year in our 2015 to 2024 record, and apply that to the last close.
Last close × (1 + calibrated gap / 100)
DCF Sensitivity
Illustrative calibrated values from the standalone DCF scenarios below, anchored to the same last close. These scenarios leave out the other parts of a blended model and do not reproduce the headline value.
Earnings Quality
Financial Forensics
Ranked vs Vietnamese peers. The −1.78 Beneish cutoff is US-calibrated; ~28% of VN stocks exceed it.
Checks measured on Vietnamese companies · FY2025
- Cash conversion, 3 yearsOperating cash flow / net profit
- −2.289th pctile
- Receivables outside the trade cyclePrepayments to suppliers, loans and other long-term receivables / total assets
- 9.7%80th pctile
- Accumulated losses / paid-in capitalUndistributed earnings below zero
- None
- Consecutive years of net lossProfit after tax of the parent
- 0
- Owner's equityWithout the non-controlling interest
- Positive
Percentiles rank each fiscal year against Vietnamese non-financial companies (0 lowest, 100 highest). Over FY2015-2024, low cash conversion and a large share of receivables outside the trade cycle came before more listing trouble and more net losses the next year.
Statutory loss tests (Decree 155/2020/NĐ-CP, Art. 120(1)(e), amended by Decree 245/2025/NĐ-CP): a HOSE or HNX listing is cancelled when the audited annual statements show net losses in each of the latest 3 years, accumulated losses above the paid-in charter capital, or negative owner's equity. Read here from the annual statements as the data vendor publishes them.
KDH's Beneish M-Score is -1.3516 (82nd percentile versus Vietnamese peers), with a year-over-year change of -0.33, indicating the company's accounting is more aggressive than most Vietnamese peers though still above the US -1.78 cutoff. Earnings-quality metrics show concentrated weaknesses: an overall Earnings Quality Score of 26.2/100 with Cash Conversion 0.0/100 and Revenue Quality 0.0/100, while solvency and operating fundamentals are mixed (Altman Z-Score 3.46 in the ‘safe’ zone; Piotroski F-Score 5/9).
- Beneish M-Score -1.3516 (82nd Vietnam percentile): measures the likelihood of earnings manipulation patterns; the 82nd percentile means KDH scores more aggressively on Beneish components than ~82% of Vietnamese peers. The YoY change -0.33 shows the M-Score moved toward more aggressive signals this year.
- DSRI 1.2803: the Days Sales in Receivables Index above 1.0 measures receivables growing faster than sales and is consistent with revenue recognition or collection timing concerns.
- AQI 1.1711 and LVGI 1.0519: Asset quality and leverage/volume growth indices above 1.0 indicate non-current assets and asset reclassifications (AQI) and higher leverage/volume dynamics (LVGI) relative to prior year, which can reflect capitalisation or off-cycle asset recognition.
- SGI 1.4186: Sales Growth Index of 1.4186 signals rapid sales growth (measures year-over-year sales growth); rapid growth can be a legitimate business feature but is also an input into manipulative pressure in Beneish.
- TATA 0.1071: Total Accruals to Total Assets is positive and small but combined with poor cash conversion (see below) implies earnings are not being converted into cash.
- Earnings Quality Score 26.2/100 with Cash Conversion 0.0/100 and Revenue Quality 0.0/100: these measure (respectively) overall earnings quality composite, operating cash-flow conversion of profit, and the sustainability/quality of reported revenue; both cash conversion and revenue quality at 0 indicate acute weaknesses in cash support for reported earnings and in revenue quality metrics.
- Receivables outside the trade cycle 9.7% of total assets (80th Vietnam percentile): measures prepayments, loans receivable and other long-term receivables; being at 9.7% and in the 80th percentile is a material exposure to non-trade claims on assets.
- Three‑year cash conversion (operating cash flow / net profit) -2.28 (9th Vietnam percentile): this low/negative ratio means reported profits have not turned into operating cash over three years and ranks poorly versus peers.
- Director-deal registrations: 13 sale registrations (11 traders; 28,670,925 shares; 8 registrations without a volume) and 36 purchase registrations (21 traders; 87,728,200 shares; 1 registration without a volume) between 2025-10-30 and 2026-10-30 — these are registered intentions with the exchange, not executed trades, and show many insiders/related parties registering both buys and sells.
- Altman Z-Score 3.46 (safe zone): this distance-to-bankruptcy measure suggests a low short-term insolvency risk on published financials. Z-Score combines working capital, retained earnings, EBIT, market value of equity and sales to total assets.
- Piotroski F-Score 5/9 (neutral): this score measures nine fundamental signals (profitability, leverage/liquidity, operating efficiency); a 5 is middling and does not show clear financial deterioration.
- Accumulated losses: none — undistributed earnings are not negative and the company does not meet the statutory loss triggers listed under Decree 155/2020 Art.120(1)(e) as amended by Decree 245/2025; statutory loss tests are not met in the audited statements.
- Margin quality 72.5/100 and Accruals quality 58.1/100: these sub-scores indicate gross margin and accrual components are relatively stronger than revenue/cash conversion, suggesting some earnings components are supported by operating margins and moderate accrual behavior.
Top shareholders are concentrated among institutional players: Vinacapital Vietnam Opportunity Fund Ltd. 13.9%; Công ty CP Đầu Tư Tiên Lộc 11.2%; Công ty TNHH Đầu tư Tiến Lộc 11.1%; Gam Ma 8.8%; Công ty CP Đầu Tư Thương Mại Á Âu 8.7%. This pattern shows substantial institutional and related-party group ownership concentration rather than a dispersed retail base; director-deal registrations show multiple insiders/related persons registering both buys and sells in the 12-month window.
- Compare the year‑end 2025 schedule of receivables and the related‑party disclosure: quantify prepayments, loans receivable and long‑term receivables that make up the 9.7% of total assets.
- Reconcile consolidated operating cash flow to parent profit for FY2023–FY2025: verify the components that produce the three‑year cash conversion ratio of -2.28 (operating cash flow / net profit).
- Inspect the revenue recognition note and sales-by-segment or by-customer schedule to assess the drivers of DSRI 1.2803 and SGI 1.4186 (days‑sales/receivables and sales growth), including any large year‑end sales, returns, or related-party contracts.
- Review the directors’ and major shareholders’ registration disclosures filed with HOSE/HNX between 2025-10-30 and 2026-10-30 to confirm the details of the 13 sale and 36 purchase registrations (volumes, beneficiaries, purpose statements).
Generated by AI based on quantitative data. Not financial advice.
Quantitative Scores
Key Ratios
- P/B
- 0.93
- P/S
- 3.72
- ROE
- 5.8%
- ROA
- 3.2%
- EPS
- 932
- BVPS
- 16.506
- Gross Margin
- 59.2%
- Net Margin
- 35.0%
- D/E
- 0.48
- Current Ratio
- 8.99
- Rev Growth
- +42.2%
- Profit Growth
- +29.9%
- EV/EBITDA
- 12.58
- Div Yield
- —
Company Overview
- Shares outstanding
- 1,245M
- Charter Capital
- 12,453B VND
- Sector (ICB L2)
- Bất động sản
- Industry (ICB L3)
- Bất động sản
- Sub-industry
- Bất động sản
- Company Type
- CT