PEN

• Beneish M-Score -1.4178 (81st percentile among Vietnamese peers; YoY change +0.08) — the M-Score combines eight ratios to signal earnings manipulation risk; the company sits well above most Vietnamese peers by percentile and is moving slightly toward more aggressive accounting year-over-year.
• TATA (total accruals / total assets) = 0.1823 (18.23%) — TATA measures the extent of accruals; a positive and relatively large value increases the M-Score and indicates high accruals relative to assets.
• SGI (sales growth index) = 1.4466 — SGI measures year-over-year sales growth; a 44.66% increase is large and, in the Beneish framework, rapid revenue growth can be associated with increased accounting risk.
• GMI (gross margin index) = 1.1591 — GMI > 1 means gross margins have deteriorated year-over-year (here ~15.9% change), which can create incentives to manage earnings.
• Earnings-Quality: cash conversion = 0.0/100 and margin quality = 0.0/100 — these component scores indicate very weak cash-based earnings and deteriorating margins versus peers.
• Altman Z-Score = 1.46 (distress zone) — this Z-score measures financial distress (distance to bankruptcy); 1.46 places the company in the distress zone by the Altman metric.
• Accumulated losses = 0.41x paid-in capital — the company has accumulated losses equal to 41% of paid-in capital, a non-trivial erosion of capital relative to equity base.

• Receivables quality = 100.0/100 — the scoring framework shows receivables are the strongest component, indicating low indications of revenue-recognition via receivables growth.
• DSRI (days sales receivable index) = 0.7828 — DSRI < 1 indicates receivables are growing more slowly than sales (or shortening), consistent with the high receivables-quality score.
• AQI (asset quality index) = 0.7015 — AQI < 1 indicates the company’s proportion of long-lived or other non-current assets has not expanded in a way that typically signals aggressive capitalization.
• SGAI (sales, general & admin index) = 0.6126 — SGAI < 1 shows SGA expenses grew more slowly than sales, which reduces one common manipulation pressure (i.e., not masking costs by holding SGA flat while inflating sales).
• LVGI (leverage index) = 1.0358 — modest increase in leverage (3.58%) rather than a jump in debt; not an exacerbating signal compared with more dramatic leverage swings.

Ownership is concentrated: a Petrolimex construction & trading subsidiary holds 30.0%, followed by a listed bank PGB at 5.2% and three individuals holding 5.0%, 4.8% and 4.3%. The large 30% institutional block and several meaningful insider/individual stakes indicate significant block-holder influence; director-deal registrations show one sale registration (2025-10-30 to 2026-10-30), which are intentions to trade and not executed trades.

• Compare FY2025 ‘prepayments to suppliers’, ‘loans receivable’ and ‘other long-term receivables’ line items with the related-party note and the receivables aging schedule to confirm the composition of the 3.5% of total assets classified as receivables outside the trade cycle.
• Reconcile profit before tax and net profit with cash flows from operating activities in the cash-flow statement and the notes to verify the cash-conversion weakness (cash conversion score = 0.0/100).
• Inspect the fixed-asset and depreciation policy note and the reconciliation of opening/closing gross carrying amounts and accumulated depreciation to understand DEPI = 0.9347 and whether depreciation policies or revaluations changed materially in FY2025.
• Review the equity and statutory notes that show accumulated losses (0.41x paid-in capital), the parent profit line (net loss years = 0), and the statutory loss test disclosures to confirm that none of the Decree 155/2020 Art.120(1)(e) (amended) delisting-loss conditions were met in the published audited statements.