Calibrated intrinsic value vs last close
Illustrative estimate- Last close (VND)
- 8.900
- Calibrated intrinsic value (VND)
- 10.764
Last close × (1 + calibrated gap / 100)
Earnings-capitalised value
Not available: the company reported a loss last year or its shares have too short a price history.
How it is calculated
- 1Measure the gap
Between the model and the last close.
- 2Check the record2015–2024
What gaps of that size went on to earn over the following year.
- 3Apply to the close
That return is applied to the last close.
Keep in mind
- For illustration only: not a validated forecast.
- No uncertainty range: the estimate is a single figure.
- Older record: it has not been re-measured on the current data.
Why it needs review
- Trading liquidity is below the comparison threshold.
- The latest cash flow is zero or negative.
- Recent losses require review of cash-flow assumptions.
This estimate remains visible for checking its calculation. Its inputs require review before using it in a stock comparison. The model comparison behind this value needs review. The estimate does not remove the data limitations listed above.
Comparison assessed 3 Nov 2026Valid through 29 Nov 2026
- Model reliability
- Low
- Model fitInput stabilityRisk checks
- High requires the model’s diagnostic criteria to be met.
- Probability of outperforming peers
- Not assessed
- A separate peer-outperformance probability is unavailable for this valuation.
These assessments address different questions. Neither establishes that the displayed valuation is correct or guarantees a future return.
Valuation Breakdown
Technology companies combine high growth potential with the risk of overvaluation. This model blends DCF (60% weight, capturing long-duration growth) with a P/E sanity check (40% weight, capping speculative excess). The DCF lets growth fade more slowly than in any other sector, recognizing that tech companies can sustain competitive advantages longer. The P/E component applies a dynamic ceiling: max P/E = min(growth% x 1.5, 30), preventing runaway valuations.
Technical details
Tech firms combine high growth potential with current profitability that peers can benchmark. Pure DCF could overvalue if growth assumptions are too aggressive. The P/E blend acts as a market-calibrated anchor, while the PEG-based cap prevents paying excessive multiples.
DCF: 10-year FCF projection with growth capped at 20%, fading more slowly than in any other sector toward the sector's long-run growth rate. P/E: 5-year median P/E capped at dynamic ceiling (growth x 1.5, max 30). Blend: 60% DCF + 40% P/E.
Technology and IT companies where high growth potential must be balanced against the risk of speculative overvaluation.
We take the model’s gap to the last close, read what gaps of that size went on to earn over the following year in our 2015 to 2024 record, and apply that to the last close.
Last close × (1 + calibrated gap / 100)
DCF Sensitivity
Illustrative calibrated values from the standalone DCF scenarios below, anchored to the same last close. These scenarios leave out the other parts of a blended model and do not reproduce the headline value.
Earnings Quality
Financial Forensics
Ranked vs Vietnamese peers. The −1.78 Beneish cutoff is US-calibrated; ~28% of VN stocks exceed it.
Checks measured on Vietnamese companies · FY2025
- Receivables outside the trade cyclePrepayments to suppliers, loans and other long-term receivables / total assets
- 0.7%28th pctile
- Accumulated losses / paid-in capitalUndistributed earnings below zero
- 0.11×
- Consecutive years of net lossProfit after tax of the parent
- 1
- Owner's equityWithout the non-controlling interest
- Positive
Percentiles rank each fiscal year against Vietnamese non-financial companies (0 lowest, 100 highest). Over FY2015-2024, low cash conversion and a large share of receivables outside the trade cycle came before more listing trouble and more net losses the next year.
Statutory loss tests (Decree 155/2020/NĐ-CP, Art. 120(1)(e), amended by Decree 245/2025/NĐ-CP): a HOSE or HNX listing is cancelled when the audited annual statements show net losses in each of the latest 3 years, accumulated losses above the paid-in charter capital, or negative owner's equity. Read here from the annual statements as the data vendor publishes them.
The accounting-score picture for SMT shows multiple warning signals: a Beneish M-Score of 0.9226 that ranks in the 96th percentile versus Vietnamese peers (higher = more aggressive accounting) and a year‑over‑year increase of +4.49, driven by high AQI (10.0000) and SGAI (4.9139). Fundamental-health scores are weak: Altman Z‑Score 0.21 (distress zone) and Piotroski F‑Score 1/9; earnings‑quality is low overall (38.5/100) with very poor accruals quality (18.2/100) and cash conversion (0.0/100), though revenue and receivables quality are strong (93.6/100 and 99.4/100 respectively).
- Beneish M‑Score = 0.9226 (96th percentile vs VN peers; YoY change +4.49). The M‑Score measures statistical likelihood of earnings manipulation signals; the high peer percentile and strong YoY jump indicate atypically aggressive accounting behavior relative to Vietnamese peers (note: the -1.78 US cutoff is less directly applicable in VN).
- AQI (Accruals Quality Index) = 10.0000. AQI measures abnormal accruals magnitude; an extremely high value indicates large accruals relative to earnings and assets.
- SGAI (Sales, General & Administrative expenses Index) = 4.9139. SGAI >1 suggests SGA expenses grew faster than sales; here SGA rose ~4.9x relative to sales growth, which can signal expense recognition/timing differences or reclassification.
- TATA (Total Accruals to Total Assets) = 0.2633. TATA measures the extent of accruals in reported earnings; 26.33% is sizable and consistent with the high AQI and low accruals‑quality score.
- LVGI (Leverage Index) = 1.5655 and GMI (Gross Margin Index) = 1.2211. LVGI >1 implies rising leverage; GMI >1 shows gross margins deteriorated year over year — both increase pressure on reported earnings quality.
- Earnings‑quality components: overall 38.5/100 with accruals quality 18.2/100 and cash conversion 0.0/100. These measure respectively (a) reliability of accruals, and (b) ability to convert reported profit into cash; both are weak here.
- Altman Z‑Score = 0.21 (distress zone). Z‑Score estimates bankruptcy distance; 0.21 is deep in the distress range, indicating low cushion from insolvency metrics used by the model.
- Piotroski F‑Score = 1/9 (weak fundamentals). The F‑Score combines profitability, leverage/liquidity, and operating efficiency signals; a score of 1 indicates very few improving fundamentals.
- Receivables outside the trade cycle = 0.7% of total assets (28th percentile among VN non‑financials). While not large in absolute terms, the metric captures prepayments, loans receivable and long‑term receivables — any concentration or related‑party exposure here warrants scrutiny.
- Net loss (parent profit) in 1 consecutive years up to FY2025 and accumulated losses = 0.11× paid‑in capital. These are signs of recent operating losses and retained loss history relative to capital (but not statutory thresholds for delisting).
- Receivables quality = 99.4/100 and Revenue quality = 93.6/100. These scores measure (respectively) the conservatism/collectibility and persistence of reported revenues/receivables; both are very strong here, suggesting reported sales and receivable recognition are comparatively high quality.
- DSRI (Days Sales Receivable Index) = 1.0011 (≈1). DSRI measures whether receivables are growing faster than sales; a value near 1 indicates no material abnormal acceleration in receivables relative to revenue.
- DEPI = 0.0000. DEPI measures changes in depreciation policy/estimates; a zero reading indicates no unusual change in recorded depreciation rates or patterns captured by the index.
- Receivables outside the trade cycle only 0.7% of assets (28th percentile). In the Vietnamese peer context this is a relatively low share of non‑trade receivables compared with peers.
Ownership is concentrated in individuals: Nguyễn Năng Hòa 17.8% and Trần Thị Thùy Dương 14.2%, with three other individuals holding 4.9–5.0% each. Director‑deal registrations show 0 sales and 2 purchase registrations (between 2025‑10‑30 and 2026‑10‑30); these are registered intentions with the exchange, not executed trades.
- Compare the FY2025 note(s) on prepayments, loans receivable and other long‑term receivables to verify the 0.7% of total assets figure and identify related‑party counterparty lines.
- Reconcile total accruals (TATA = 0.2633) with the cash‑flow statement: compare profit before tax to cash flows from operations and the detailed reconciliation of profit to cash flow in the annual report.
- Inspect the SGA breakdown and the SGA note to determine causes of the SGAI = 4.9139 (e.g., one‑off items, reclassifications, salary/bonus accruals or marketing spending timing).
- Check the statutory audit opinion and the audited equity and loss schedules to confirm (a) accumulated losses = 0.11× paid‑in capital, (b) the parent net loss in FY2025, and (c) that none of the statutory loss tests cited (Decree 155/2020 Art.120(1)(e) as amended) are met.
Generated by AI based on quantitative data. Not financial advice.
Quantitative Scores
Key Ratios
- P/B
- 1.00
- P/S
- 1.88
- ROE
- −9.5%
- ROA
- −4.4%
- EPS
- −926
- BVPS
- 8.878
- Gross Margin
- −7.9%
- Net Margin
- −19.5%
- D/E
- 0.26
- Current Ratio
- 0.89
- Rev Growth
- −68.5%
- Profit Growth
- −608.1%
- EV/EBITDA
- —
- Div Yield
- 4.7%
Company Overview
- Shares outstanding
- 6.6M
- Charter Capital
- 65.6B VND
- Sector (ICB L2)
- Công nghệ Thông tin
- Industry (ICB L3)
- Thiết bị và Phần cứng
- Sub-industry
- Thiết bị viễn thông
- Company Type
- CT