S4A

• Beneish M‑Score -1.0851 and Vietnam peer percentile 87th: the M‑Score measures the likelihood of earnings manipulation signals; this company scores higher (more aggressive) than 87% of Vietnamese peers and the M‑Score has moved +1.63 year‑over‑year, indicating accounting-based signals are trending toward greater aggressiveness relative to its past.
• DSRI 1.9610 (days‑sales‑in‑receivables index): DSRI measures changes in receivables relative to sales; a value near 1.96 implies receivables have grown markedly faster than sales, which can indicate revenue recognition timing or collection issues.
• AQI 1.2343 (asset quality index): AQI measures the proportion of long‑lived and potentially manipulable assets (e.g., capitalization) relative to total assets; 1.2343 indicates an increase in such assets versus the prior period.
• Revenue quality 0.0/100 and Receivables quality 0.0/100: these scores indicate the model finds very weak evidence that reported revenues are supported by durable, high‑quality cash/receivable patterns and that receivable composition or collectability is poor by the scoring rules.
• Earnings‑quality component: SGI 1.3185 (sales growth index) combined with SGAI 0.8740 and GMI 0.9329: sales are growing (SGI > 1), gross margin index below 1 (GMI 0.9329) indicates improving gross margin, while SGAI < 1 suggests lower SG&A intensity — the combination of rapid sales growth and the M‑Score rise is a pattern where revenue growth can obscure other pressures.

• Altman Z‑Score 3.02: this is in the 'safe' zone for bankruptcy distance; the Altman Z measures financial distress risk using liquidity, profitability and leverage components.
• Piotroski F‑Score 7/9: this score summarizes nine fundamental tests (profitability, leverage/liquidity, and operating efficiency); a 7 indicates generally strong operating and financial fundamentals.
• Accruals quality 89.9/100 and TATA 0.0254: accruals quality is high and total accruals to assets (TATA) are low (2.54%), which suggests reported profits are not being driven by large accounting accruals.
• Receivables outside the trade cycle 0.0% of total assets (5th percentile): the explicit check for receivables outside normal trade (prepayments, loans receivable, long‑term receivables) is negligible, reducing concerns about material off‑balance receivable schemes.

Ownership is concentrated: Công Ty TNHH 30‑4 Gia Lai holds 51.8% (controlling stake), followed by Vĩnh Hiệp 11.5% and related institutional holders; director‑deal registrations show one purchase registration (844,000 shares) and net registered volume +2.00% of shares outstanding between 2025‑10‑30 and 2026‑10‑30. This structure implies strong controlling shareholder influence and some insider registration activity (registrations are not executed trades).

• Compare the FY2025 receivables ageing note and the related‑party receivables schedule to confirm that increases implied by DSRI 1.9610 are not concentrated in a small set of slow accounts or related parties.
• Reconcile cash flow from operations to reported net profit in the cash flow note (verify the components underlying cash conversion 1.16 over three years) and check the notes that explain significant non‑cash items given TATA 0.0254 and high accruals quality.
• Review the revenue recognition policy and any disclosures (sales returns, rebates, consignment, cut‑off) and the contract/revenue note to assess why revenue quality scored 0.0/100 despite SGI 1.3185.
• Inspect the fixed‑asset and intangible‑asset movement schedules (capex, capitalization, reclassifications) to understand the AQI 1.2343 increase and whether asset classifications or useful lives changed (DEPI 1.0000 indicates no change in depreciation index).