L40

• Beneish M-Score = 2.9495 (measures likelihood of earnings manipulation based on financial-ratio signals); the company sits at the 98th percentile among Vietnamese peers (higher = more aggressive accounting) and the M-Score rose by +3.41 year-over-year (the trajectory is a secondary cue).
• DSRI = 5.4311 (days sales receivable index component of Beneish measures the change in receivables relative to sales and inventory activity) — an unusually high value consistent with receivables growing faster than sales or with receivables being outside the ordinary trade cycle.
• TATA = 0.3595 (total accruals to assets; part of the Beneish score) and Accruals quality = 5.4/100 (measures the reliability of accruals) — both indicate a high level of accrual-based profit relative to assets and weak accrual quality.
• Earnings-Quality = 1.3/100 with Cash conversion = 0.0/100, Receivables quality = 0.0/100, Margin quality = 0.0/100, Revenue quality = 0.0/100 (these components measure how much reported earnings are supported by cash, receivable behaviour, margins and revenue patterns) — collectively they flag weak support for reported profits.
• Three-year cash conversion (operating cash flow / net profit) = -0.08 (21st percentile among VN non-financials) — indicates that, over three years, operating cash flow was lower than net profit and places the company in the lower quintile for converting profit into cash.
• DEPI = 0.3162 (depreciation index component of Beneish; a value below 1 can indicate slower reported depreciation relative to historical rates) and AQI = 1.0000 (asset quality index) — signals to examine fixed-asset and intangible capitalization and depreciation policies.

• SGI = 1.0313 (sales growth index; measures sales growth year-over-year) — modest sales growth rather than extreme expansion.
• LVGI = 0.7749 (leverage index component in Beneish; a value below 1 indicates leverage did not increase aggressively) — no large upward leverage signal from this metric.
• Altman Z-Score = 2.85 (measures distance to bankruptcy; the company sits in the 'grey zone' rather than the distress zone), and Piotroski F-Score = 4/9 (measures nine fundamental signals) — neither score indicates acute financial distress or very strong fundamentals; Piotroski is neutral.
• Receivables outside the trade cycle = 2.4% of total assets (53rd percentile among Vietnamese peers) — the level of prepayments/loans/long-term receivables is around the median for local peers, not unusually large.

Ownership is concentrated among individuals: five named individuals together hold 65.9% (Bùi Trung Thu 20.8%, Đỗ Tấn Cường 18.6%, Đinh Văn Xuân 10.4%, Đinh Đức Trung 9.5%, Lê Văn Thịnh 6.6%), which indicates concentrated control and potential for related‑party transactions typical in Vietnamese group structures and family ownership.

• Compare the year-over-year change in trade receivables and 'loans and receivables' in the FY2025 balance sheet to sales in the revenue note and to the receivables aging schedule to explain DSRI = 5.4311.
• Reconcile total accruals (profit before tax minus cash from operations) to TATA = 0.3595 and inspect the notes on provisions, capitalization policies and depreciation to understand DEPI = 0.3162 and AQI = 1.0000.
• Verify the components of operating cash flow in the cash-flow statement and the reconciliation to net profit to confirm the three-year cash conversion = -0.08 and to identify which items (changes in working capital, non-cash adjustments) drive the negative conversion.
• Check the related‑party schedules, prepayments and 'other receivables' notes for amounts that make up the 2.4% of total assets listed as receivables outside the trade cycle, and match those to the largest shareholders or group disclosures.